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Abstract 
 
Using data from a Bank of Italy survey, this paper analyzes the Italian taxi market and its recent 
changes. Local regulations are rather homogeneous, while there is a widespread disproportion, within 
municipalities advisory committees, between the number of taxi drivers representatives and that of 
consumers’; indicators of service adequacy are seldom used. Service costs are rather homogeneous across 
Italian provinces, while there is great variance as to supply and fares. The instruments provided to 
municipalities by the new Bersani law have been used mainly in major cities. Service increase, achieved 
mainly through additional shifts rather than through the provision of (free) additional licenses, was often 
obtained in exchange for fare increases; the use of traffic policies has been almost absent. It is difficult to 
evaluate the adequacy of local decisions, given the lack of non-occasional information on market 
structure. 
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They ought to adapt to the evolution. 
For everybody’s sake, including their species. 
 
Patrizio Roversi1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As in many other branches of the transport sector, taxi and limousine services (in 
Italian “noleggio con conducente” – NCC) received recently the attention of the Italian 
legislator. Even if there are still a sizable regulation and high entry barriers in taxi 
markets, in the summer of 2006 a new legislation has given to municipalities additional 
instruments to increase supply. 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Chiara Bentivogli (chiara.bentivogli@bancaditalia.it) 
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 Interviewed by the newspaper La Repubblica (March 22, 2007) on the project of Bologna municipality 
to increase the number of taxi licences. 
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This paper examines the situation, using data from a Bank of Italy survey in the first 
months of 2007 in 66 main Italian cities. The survey follows the first one carried out in 
2004 in the capitals of Italian provinces (Bentivogli, Calderini, 2007), and investigates 
the links between the choices of the local regulator and the supply and efficiency of the 
service. 
Section 2 summarizes the main characteristics of the service and the different kinds of 
regulation suggested by economic theory; section 3 presents the national regulatory 
framework. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the results of the second Bank of Italy’s survey on 
the differences among local regulations and taxi and NCC supply at the territorial level; 
finally section 6 presents some policy implications. 
 
 
2. Service characteristics and regulation 
 
From a technological point of view, taxi and NCC services show low fixed costs, sunk 
costs nearly null, low economies of scale (with the exception of the collateral services 
of radio-dispatching) and low economies of scope. The cost function, that includes the 
cost of labour (with very low professional requirements) and the costs of buying and 
operating the car (the cost of fuel in particular), is greatly influenced by a set of context 
variables (congestion, reserved lanes, urban density). These same factors can also 
influence demand, that depends – besides general economic context – on service cost 
and quality compared to other transport options.  
Local transport demand - including taxi, limousine services as well as public and 
private transport - meets the needs of mobility of residents and of visitors of a city, 
being a derived demand. In general, the spatial movement of the consumer does not 
have an utility in itself, but allows her to benefit from goods and services otherwise not 
available. Consumer’s decisions include the destination, the timing, the route, and the 
transportation mode; the choice of a specific means of transport depends on relative 
monetary and time costs as well as on the relative intrinsic comfort. For a given price of 
transportation, the substitutability among the different transport modes depends on 
several factors: waiting time, relative speed and its uncertainty (variability), private cars 
access to the different city zones, availability and cost of parking, travel comfort, special 
needs (disabled persons, heavy luggage, and so on). In general taxi offers a point to 
point service more comfortable and faster than other means of transportation and 
without accessory monetary and time costs (for example, it does not require to find and 
pay for parking), usually with a lower uncertainty on expected transport time. High taxi 
waiting time and a surface traffic particularly severe can nevertheless make the 
underground (in the cities where it is available) a strict substitute for taxi.  
Traffic control measures – for example the presence in large parts of the city of 
reserved lanes and parking only for taxi or public transit – can therefore reduce taxi 
costs and at the same time increase taxi demand. This shows how market equilibria can 
vary greatly – since they do not move along traditional demand and supply curves that 
relate the service price and quantity – depending on the contextual factors. More 
generally the nature of taxi demand, that depends on its price but also on a variety of 
service characteristics, creates the possibility of multiple equilibria: demand may in fact 
depend on supply size through its dependence on waiting time (which in its turn 
depends on supply as well as on the size of demand itself), so that an increase in supply 
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(for a given fare), by reducing waiting time, can increase demand (the so called 
Mohring effect).  
This point can be clarified through an extremely simplified scheme (Douglas, 1972; 
Beesley, Glaister, 1983; Cairns, Liston-Heyes, 1996; Lam, Bell, 2003) where in each 
time unit (for example one hour) there are n taxi circulating in the city (n=Nh/24, where 
N is total licences/taxis number and h is the average number of working hours of taxi 
drivers) of which E are engaged and V are vacant (n=E+V). The demand for trips in 
each hour2 depends on the average fare per trip p, on the waiting time of customers w, 
on a series of exogenous variables x, among which, for example, the average taxi speed 
(which is a function of the length of reserved lanes, and so on), and on the level of these 
variables with respect to that of alternative means of transport (same variables with an a 
index): 
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where w is waiting time (expressed as a fraction of one hour) which depends on the 
number of vacant cabs V, and p (the average fare per trip) is a function of current fares 
and of the average trip time t (fraction of an hour). In every point of time the average 
number of engaged and vacant cabs will be given by: 
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For given values of the remaining parameters, it is possible to write the waiting time 
of the customer as a decreasing function of supply (number of licences and average time 
of use of cabs) and as an increasing function of demand: 
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Under the assumption that waiting time elasticity with respect to vacant cabs is 
constant and equal to one for any level of V, for example if w=g/V, it can be rewritten 
as: 
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This formulation helps to clarify that changes in supply (through changes in N and/or 
in h, that represent respectively the extensive and intensive margin of supply change) 
                                                 
2
 We assume that demand is uniformly distributed during the day. 
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and in fares – in Italy both fixed by the regulator – do not need necessarily to move in 
opposite directions. Even in the absence of exogenous shifts in demand curve – due to 
the local economic context, to the traffic management, and to the quality of taxi 
compared to that of other transportation services – an increase in supply (an increase in 
n), will reduce w and increase demand, without implying necessarily a reduction of p.  
The size of demand change will depend on the relationship between V, w and E: 
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is the waiting time elasticity of demand for trips. If demand elasticity is low with respect 
to waiting time (|ω|<1), an increase in the number of cabs (n) will generate a less than 
proportional increase in demand. A low elasticity of demand with respect to waiting 
time could reflect for example a lack of substitutes among other means of local public 
transportation, due to a significant fare gap and a low availability of fast public 
transportation (underground or surface transit with reserved lanes). On the other hand, if 
demand is very elastic with respect to waiting time, then (for given p) an increase in the 
number of cabs n will create by itself a sufficient increase in demand. 
Assuming that the hourly cost of taxi service is constant and independent of the cab 
being vacant or engaged,3 the impact of an increase in n on unit profits will depend only 
on demand sensitivity: 
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If the function w is (4′′), (6) can be rewritten as: 
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The possibility of a relatively inelastic demand with respect to waiting time could 
explain the strong opposition of taxi drivers to an increase in the number of licences for 
given fares (see further on). Whilst the interaction between demand and service 
availability does not imply necessarily a decrease in unit profits (and even less lower 
fares that, in the strongly regulated settings that characterize the sector, are 
predetermined too), the incumbents’ perception is that demand in not very much 
sensitive to waiting time and hence to service availability. 
On the other hand, the pressure of incumbents in favour of a fare increase implies that 
they perceive a low sensitivity of demand to fare changes. The impact on unit revenues 
of a fare increase, given n, will be given by: 
                                                 
3
 In short this assumption implies that the main component of taxi costs is the opportunity-cost of labour. 
Notice that in this case supply changes due to an increase in the number of licences N or to an increase of 
the intensity of taxi use (h/24, where h is the average daily schedule of use of each taxi) will be quite 
equivalent. 
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Qη  is the price elasticity of demand for trips. Since the right hand 
side of the inequality (7) is always negative (ω<0), unit revenues will increase for |η|≤1, 
while they could increase or fall if demand is very elastic with respect to price. In short, 
a rise in p produces a fall in demand but also in waiting time and this last variable tends 
in its turn to influence demand positively. More in general, even if the regulator chooses 
the level both of p and of n, market equilibrium is determined by the value assumed by 
waiting time according to demand characteristics and its relationship with supply and 
demand (the 4′′).  
The role of waiting time as a variable that adjust the market to equilibrium explains 
why prices and quantities does not move always and necessarily in opposite directions 
(as it would be natural to expect given a normal demand schedule). In a competitive 
market - with free entry in the presence of extra profits and variations in service 
quantity depending on profitability conditions of the individual operator - price and 
waiting time will adjust so as to ensure a service availability suitable to demand. In a 
regulated market, waiting time and the actual use of the service (paying demand) will 
adjust given fares and service availability (in terms of N and h, usually both fixed by the 
regulator).4  
Actually this interaction between demand and supply could also motivate the presence 
of a regulation in an industry that does not seem to have any feature of a natural 
monopoly: in a perfectly competitive market the suppliers of the service could not 
internalize the effects of the presence of vacant cabs on the intensity of demand and end 
up supplying an insufficient service (Bergantino et al., 2007). This possibility is 
particularly important with reference to the availability of the service in non standard 
hours, that might be overlooked by the incumbents and that a regulator could guarantee 
by fixing minimum service standards (basically, by setting compulsory shifts in some 
specific hours of the day).  
Another critical aspect of the service is that fare fixing by a regulator can by itself 
favour the meeting of demand and supply: in a hypothetical regime of free competition, 
where, every time the service is needed, the customer and the taxi driver have to bargain 
bilaterally for the trip price, the results could be very variable, with a high uncertainty 
for customers and cab drivers and high search costs that could determine an undersizing 
of the market (Visco Comandini et al., 2004); this supports the usefulness of forms of 
regulation specifically targeted at increasing transparency, including the setting (to 
protect consumers) of maximum fares. 
Only in the first of the two cases mentioned here the introduction of entry barriers by 
the regulator could be justified: it would be a compensation for the obligation to supply 
the service in times of slack demand. Notice that service obligation characterizes taxis 
but not limousine services (that do not have a service obligation). Some form of 
registration of all the operators (taxi and NCC) could be anyway necessary in order to 
                                                 
4
 Clearly the regulator cannot, in the long run, impose the presence of an “excessive” number of operators 
or shifts in the market (violating their profitability constraint). Therefore in the regulated market the use 
of the service will be as a rule lower than would have otherwise. 
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determine who is authorized to use the reserved lanes: the goal to avoid congestion 
could be achieved through road pricing mechanisms (and the introduction of parking 
fees) and not necessarily through forms of limitation of entry of new operators (that 
entering in the market get anyhow a “privilege” in the use of the road network - a fixed 
resource - and in particular of the reserved lanes). 
This last possibility seems to suggest a possible link between the regulation of the 
service (in terms of rationing of licences and fare fixing) and other public policies 
concerning traffic and mobility (Beesley, 1973). In fact, the variables t, x, pa, wa, and xa 
are influenced to a large extent by local policies. For example the average length of a 
trip depends on the dispersion in the area of the main interest points of the city and on 
the proportion between the fixed and the variable component of the fare; from this last 
aspect, an increase in the trip average price will increase the demand for longer trips 
(and therefore t) and reduce the shortest ones, if it is achieved mainly through an 
increase of the fixed component of the fare. Likewise an improvement of mobility 
conditions for cabs can raise their average speed and reduce t and w (for given n and p). 
Last, qualitative improvements in transport substitutes can drive down demand for taxi 
services in favour of other means of transportation and make demand for taxis more 
elastic (as more easily substitutable) with respect to price and waiting time. 
The motivations and the features of the current regulation seem to reflect only partly 
what indicated so far. The diffused presence of entry barriers seems more linked to 
forms of protection of the incumbents than to the presence of service obligations: in 
Italy taxi licences, as well as NCC authorizations, are distributed free of charge,5 but in 
limited quantities, in the primary market, having often a very high secondary market 
value. The restriction in the number of taxis ends up passing on NCC market, given the 
indirect competition to taxi service that could derive from it. 
Other features of Italian regulation do not seem especially geared to efficiency, rather 
they seem to derive from some forms of pressure on the regulator (Stigler, 1971). For 
example, the prohibition to cumulate licences or to create taxi companies determines a 
dispersion of supply which makes it similar the payoff of each incumbent, facilitating 
the capture of regulator. 
Whichever is the origin and the aim of the regulation, it should require, in order to 
avoid forms of capture of the regulator and to her benefit, the availability of abundant 
and accurate information on the structural and cyclical situation of the market (Basili, 
2008). There is the need of analyses on consumers’ types (residents and visitors, users 
and non-users, frequent users and occasional ones, business and private users), on their 
demand elasticity with respect to price, income, and waiting time, on the pattern of 
services requested in terms of main destinations and average trip length, on actual 
quality and waiting time, on fixed and variables costs of the provision of the service. 
Moreover regulation should stem from an evaluation of the role of taxi and NCC in the 
local public transportation system and from studies on the impact of the different 
measures of traffic control (parking limitations, reserved lanes, and so on). 
Finally, in order to avoid regulatory capture, the level of regulation should be 
sufficiently “high”. From this point of view the municipal level looks rather vulnerable 
to capture and not very much representative of customers, given that a big proportion of 
potential demand is expressed by non residents (Noam, 1982). 
                                                 
5
 The Bersani law introduced the possibility (de facto not much used) of introducing licensing fees for the 
new operators (see further on). 
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3. The national legislation 
 
The Italian legislation on taxi and limousine services (NCC) consists of a national law 
(general policy law No 21/19926), regional laws, and municipal bylaws. In 2006 the 
general policy law has been partially modified by paragraph 6 of law No 248/2006 – 
Bersani law).7 
The changes introduced with the recent legislation try to answer to the widespread 
protests of customers that complained about the insufficient supply. The need for a 
reform was strengthened by the poor supply of fast public urban transportation 
(undergrounds), that tends to increase the use of private cars, with negative effects on 
road congestion (including parking in prohibited zones) and on average speed of urban 
public transport by road. The high cost of licences on the secondary market (see section 
5) indicated also an excess of demand and the presence of regulation rents. The recent 
changes in the legislation follow a series of proposals of reform of the sector,8 yet they 
do not modify the general setting. As a matter of fact the law merely offers some 
additional options to municipalities willing to increase the supply of the service, a 
power that they already had on the basis of the law of 1992. Moreover some of the 
options included in the decree initially enacted have been eliminated or substantially 
rescaled at the moment of turning the decree into a law, following the protests of the 
taxi drivers; in particular it has been eliminated the possibility for a taxi driver to have 
more than one licence and the introduction of temporary or seasonal authorizations has 
been reserved mostly to incumbents. 
The national general policy law distinguishes between taxi services, with obligation to 
park in public spaces and fares regulated by municipalities, and limousine services 
(NCC), with obligation to park in a garage, non regulated fares, and availability only by 
phone. Municipalities, on the basis of principles indicated by regional laws, set, by 
means of specific regulations, the procedures for the service (shifts, and so on), taxi 
fares, and give taxi licences and authorizations for limousine services.  
Licences (authorizations for NCC) are referred to a single vehicle, are given free of 
charge through an open competition and are transferable. The Bersani law introduces 
the possibility of assigning licences against payment and in this last case at least 80% of 
the revenues must be given to the local incumbents. Other ways of increasing supply 
have also been introduced, by giving municipalities the power to assign (mostly to 
incumbents) non-transferable specific temporary or seasonal authorizations, allowing 
incumbents the possibility to use substitutes and additional vehicles for services to 
specific groups of customers and to provide for innovative services. 
Taxi licences are released to individuals (that can be on the artisans’ register, 
associated in cooperatives or consortia) and cannot be cumulated (as mentioned, this 
was allowed by the previous decree). Municipalities set the requisites for the granting of 
the licence (authorization for NCC). It is possible for family members to drive the 
vehicle instead of the car owner, and in some specific cases (holidays, health problems, 
and so on) to have other subjects as substitutes in driving. For NCC the same person, 
                                                 
6
 General policy for the transportation of persons through public car and bus non scheduled services.  
7 Law by decree No 223/2006, converted with modifications in the law No 248/2006. 
8
 The most important proposals have been made by the Agency for the control and the quality of local 
public services of the municipality of Roma (AGSPL, 2004a), by the Antitrust authority (AGCM, 1995, 
2004) and by several academic contributors (for example, Boitani and Bergantino, 2003; Bordignon and 
Boitani, 2003). 
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that can also be a private entrepreneur, can cumulate authorizations and hire workers 
(and have driver substitutes). The law No 248/2006 attributes to municipalities the 
faculty to extend the use of driver substitutes for taxi drivers when supplementary shifts 
are established. 
Taxi and NCC services are different also in terms of fares (set by municipalities in the 
first case, set by operators in the second one) and of mandatory service. For taxis, the 
law of 2006 has reinforced the power of municipalities to set fares for predetermined 
trips, an option that could increase the transparency and predictability of customer’s 
charges, with positive effects on demand. 
The national general policy law provides for the creation of an advisory committee (in 
regions and municipalities), giving it some powers on the service and on the application 
of the regulation. The Bersani law also provides for the possibility of establishing a 
committee for the monitoring of regularity, efficiency and adequacy of the service to 
demand conditions. In both cases the law provides for the participation of 
representatives of customers and incumbents. The distinction between the functions of 
the two committees is not clear. Moreover, the competence of the advisory committee 
on the evaluation of the application of regulations is improper, given the presence of 
conflicts of interest among the regulator and some members of the committee 
(regulated). The other functions seem to be basically common to both of them.  
In short, the national regulation sets a barrier to entry and the requisite of registration 
to the specific roll both for taxi and for NCC drivers.9 Once entered in the market, the 
two types of operators are subject to different operational constraints: for cabs shifts and 
fares are established by municipalities, there is obligation to park in specific areas and 
licences are not cumulable; NCC permit holders can freely decide service hours and 
fares, must park in garages and licences are cumulable. The decision on the specific 
content of the regulations (shits, fares, number of licences, and so on) and the 
surveillance of their observance is assigned to municipalities, that are supported by two 
committees, an advisory committee (provided by the national law, but with very vague 
tasks), and a monitoring committee, with better defined tasks, but whose creation is 
optional. 
The types of regulation of the sector at the international level are very varied (OECD, 
2007). With reference to the taxi market, in some countries (Sweden, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Austria, Hungary, Australia, and New Zealand) a liberalization process started 
in the nineties and mainly abolished quantitative entry barriers of operators. The 
reductions of the constraints to the societal organization and the liberalization of fares 
have been less frequent. 
Even in the countries where the sector has been more liberalized, no significant 
market failures have been reported. Sweden and New Zealand started a broad 
liberalization including tariffs, but keeping some standards on service quality. In 
Norway, in the areas where there are several competing radio-dispatching firms, there 
has been a pricing deregulation with a continuation of entry quantity barriers. Local 
antitrust authority found a fare increase after deregulation, especially in hours and days 
with low demand. In London new drivers have to take a special driving test and a street 
knowledge test. In the case of Ireland, the effect of the drastic reduction in the value of 
the licences after market liberalization induced the regulator to devise forms of 
monetary compensation for some groups of operators (in other words, it is a 
                                                 
9
 Roll of drivers of vehicles or water-crafts used as public non scheduled transport services established in 
the local Chamber of commerce.  
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compensation for the cancellation of a rent created by the regulator itself). Three years 
after the liberalization of taxi licences in Ireland it has been created the Commission for 
taxi regulation, that centralizes at the national level the regulation of the sector. The 
Commission also carries out surveys on the different types of customers and operators, 
so as to increase the efficiency and the quality of the service. In 2005 the Commission 
introduced a single national maximum fare, on the basis of a study that showed the 
absence of differences in the local costs of the service. In Dublin the elimination of the 
administrative barriers to entry determined the triplication of circulating taxis in two 
years without significant deterioration in service quality (Barrett, 2003; Daly, 2004). A 
similar effect on supply has been registered in New Zealand.  
In France, a country that had so far a quite strict regulation, at the beginning of 2008 
the Attali Commission proposed to give a taxi licence free of charge to anyone has 
applied for it up to the end of 2007 and did not get it (thus adjusting effective supply to 
the potential one) and to authorize the use of the same car/licence by more than one 
driver (subjecting it only to the observance of a maximum number of hours for each 
driver, set by law and monitored with devices installed in the car). In municipalities 
where the evolution in taxi availability did not follow population trends, the prefects 
could take the mayor’s place in the management of taxi licences. At the national level 
the Ministry of Transport would regulate VPRs (similar to Italian NCC), while in the 
case of taxis it would be responsible for regulation together with the Ministry of the 
Interior, so as to avoid the concentration of regulation of the two segments of the market 
under the same ministry. Despite the renunciation by the French government of the 
Attali plan after the protests of the taxi drivers, at the end of May 2008 is has been 
accepted the proposal of the minister of the Interior that provides, among other things, 
for: i) an increase of more than 25% in cabs circulating in Paris (from 15,600 to 20,000) 
before the end of 2010, of which 1,200 within 2008; ii) greater transparency in receipts, 
that will contain details of all fare components applied; iii) a reserved lane on the 
highway to the main airport.10 
 
 
4. Regional and local regulation 
 
In the first months of 2007 the Bank of Italy conducted a survey on taxi and NCC 
service in 67 Italian municipalities, localized in all Italian regions, with more than 
50,000 inhabitants at the end of 2005.11 One of them did not participate to the survey; in 
some other cases the questionnaire has been returned incomplete. The cities have been 
chosen also on the basis of their relevance as a tourist attraction; in the case of Venezia 
                                                 
10
 In mid 2008 the cost of a taxi licence in Paris was about € 180,000; many drivers rented a car for about 
€ 700 per week, and at the end of 2007 the tax abatement on fuel reserved to taxi drivers was abolished. 
11
 The cities where the survey was conducted are: Alessandria, Ancona, Aosta, Arezzo, Asti, Bari, 
Bergamo, Bologna, Bolzano, Brescia, Brindisi, Cagliari, Campobasso, Caserta, Catania, Catanzaro, 
Como, Cosenza, Cremona, Ferrara, Firenze, Foggia, Forlì, Genova, Grosseto, La Spezia, L’Aquila, La-
tina, Lecce, Livorno, Lucca, Messina, Milano, Modena, Napoli, Novara, Padova, Palermo, Parma, Pavia, 
Perugia, Pesaro, Pescara, Piacenza, Pisa, Pistoia, Potenza, Ravenna, Reggio di Calabria, Reggio 
nell’Emilia, Rimini, Roma, Salerno, Sassari, Siena, Siracusa, Taranto, Terni, Torino, Trento, Treviso, 
Trieste, Udine, Varese, Venezia, Verona, Vicenza. Rimini did not return the questionnaire in time. 
Almost half of the administrations interviewed did not give information on the dates of the second-last 
assignment of taxi licences and almost 40% on the second-last fare change. 
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the survey concerned both the land and the lagoon services. Cities have been divided in 
three groups by population size. Big cities include 5 towns with more than 500,000 
inhabitants (Roma, Milano, Napoli, Palermo, Genova). Middle-size cities are 7 and 
include municipalities with a population between 250,000 and 500,000 units. The 
survey focused both on institutional aspects (norms, regulatory bodies, extent of 
agreement procedures among the interested parties, degree of decentralization in 
decisions) and on the market impact of the regulation in terms of licence number, level 
and fare structure, and finally on the variables considered by local regulators in order to 
decide a change in fares or in the number of licences. In this section the results of the 
survey on the institutional aspects are presented; the next section focuses on market 
situation and dynamics. The information asked in the questionnaire refer to the situation 
at the end of 2006.  
Beside the national legislation and the municipal regulations, recently Regions have 
legislated on the matter, due to the new powers given to them by the legislative decree 
422/1997 and by the reform of title V of Constitution.12 
In two third of the cases the Regions issued a specific law, 19% included the matter 
within the local public transportation regulation (and/or the regional transportation 
plan), in the remaining cases Regions did not legislate on the subject (Table 1). The 
Molise Region neither has a regional legislation nor a specific roll in the local Chambers 
of commerce. In 4 municipalities over 66 there are no local regulations for the sector 
and 10 municipalities did not answer to the specific question. In one case the Region 
and in two cases the Province have the power to approve the municipal regulations. 
In many cases the local legislation (both regional and municipal) repeats widely and 
follows closely the national one. The setting of the number of licences (and of NCC 
authorizations), of the level of fares and their change is left usually to the municipalities, 
often on the basis of general criteria (see further on). Some Regions, mainly those with 
important airport basins (in particular Lombardia) have also super-municipal 
regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The new article No 117 of Constitution does not mention local public transport neither among the 
matters of exclusive state competence nor among those of concurrent legislation. In this context the 
Constitutional Court (see decision No 222 of 2005) held that the regulation of this sector falls under the 
residual competences of the Regions specified in paragraph 4 of the article 117 of the Constitution. 
Moreover the Constitutional Court has rejected the appeal made by the Veneto Region against article 6 of 
the law No 248/2006 (concerning taxis) because the norms impugned do not discipline the organizational 
procedures and the carrying out of the service, but are referable to the cross-competencies in the matter of 
defence of competition on which the State has exclusive legislative power (see decision No 452 of 2007). 
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Table 1: Features of local regulation on taxi and NCC (percentages). 
REGIONAL LAW 
Yes, specific Yes, included in the law on local public transportation No 
66.7 19.0 14.3 
REGIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
Yes No Total 
38.1 61.9 100.0 
PROVINCIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES 
Yes No Total 
9.5 90.5 100.0 
APPROVAL OF MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS 
Only the Municipality The Province too The Region too 
19.0 9.5 4.8 
SUPER-MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS 
Yes No Total 
14.3 85.7 100.0 
 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007. 
Note: The provinces of Trento and Bolzano have been considered separately. 
 
More than one third of the Regions established advisory committees at the regional 
level and 9.5% also at the provincial level. 30.8% of the municipalities interviewed did 
not establish the advisory committee. In the municipalities where it is present, the trade 
associations (taxi, NCC, radio-dispatching companies) prevail among its members (on 
average they are more than one third of the total), while the representatives of 
consumers’ associations are a minority (on average less than one sixth of the total; 
Figure 1). 
The high representation of the category reflects the willingness of the local 
administrations to allow the participation of the many trade unions and trade 
associations (artisans, cooperatives), of which the industry operators are members. 
Moreover, the wide range, in terms of political affiliation, of taxi, NCC and radio-
dispatching associations present in each city seems to reflect the need of the industry to 
“capture” the regulator, irrespectively of the political group in power locally at each 
point in time. Among the main cities, the ratio between representatives of the 
category/customers’ representatives is particularly unbalanced in Torino and Genova 
(13/1 and 11/1, respectively). In 5 cities consumers are not represented in the 
committee. Only one municipality does not include in the committee neither operators’ 
nor consumers’ representatives. 
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Figure 1: Composition of the taxi advisory committee in the main Italian cities (percentages). 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007. 
 
These data can be summarized with a “capture” index, given by the ratio between the 
number of the operators’ representatives and the sum of the last variable and the number 
of consumers’ representatives. The index varies between 0 and 100 (maximum capture). 
Using our dataset it takes a mean value of 68.8 and it decreases with city size: is it equal 
to 64.9 in small cities, to 74.2 in middle size cities and to 86.7 in big cities.  
Only 4 municipalities have appointed the monitoring committee indicated in the 
Bersani law. With the exception of Pavia, with 2 consumers’ representatives and 1 
delegate of the operators, in these committees customers are a minority too. The new 
municipal regulation of Roma (presented at the end of 2006, revised a year after, not yet 
approved in April 2009) establishes an advisory committee with 3 experts of the 
industry, 5 delegates of the category (3 for taxi drivers and 2 for NCC), and 3 
consumers’ delegates. In the previous committee there were 17 delegates of the 
operators and 2 of consumers. It is also established that the town council should present 
to the governing council a yearly report on the monitoring of the sector. 
Local regulations do not mention, with rare exceptions, the use of indicators of 
demand in the evaluation of the adequacy of the number of taxi and NCC. In the case of 
the Piemonte region, the regional law gives to Provinces the task to indicate to the 
municipalities “measures of restraint of licences and of authorizations” on the basis of: 
population, territory size and other specific characteristics, size of tourism and business 
flows, relative supply of other local public transportation, other salient factors for local 
transportation of persons. The Province of Novara, for example, elaborated specific 
formulas of congruity of taxi and NCC supply. The law of Umbria Region specifies that 
taxi and NCC numbers must be decided by municipalities on the basis of population 
size and on the relevance of tourism, business, social, and cultural activities in the cities 
and in the surroundings, on the distances among urban poles (railway station, centre-
periphery, and so on), and on supply of local scheduled urban and suburban public 
transportation. The regional laws of Valle d’Aosta and Veneto specify that the regional 
council sets the maximum number of licences and/or authorizations for each area on the 
basis of indicators. The Veneto Region requires that at least 5% of licences is given for 
the transportation of disabled persons. In Lazio and Emilia-Romagna the setting of the 
criteria is attributed to the Provinces.  
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 41 (2009): 1-27 
 13 
In most cases the more recent decisions to assign taxi licences and/or NCC 
authorizations have not been taken on the basis of market indicators (68.7% of 
interviewed municipalities). A small share of municipalities answered they took into 
consideration generically demand (10.4%) and a similar share of municipalities 
specified instead the group of indicators used. A 2003 study of the province of Parma 
estimated the effective need for taxi and NCC on the basis of the average ratio of 
service supply/population of similar Italian provinces (and detected a shortage). In 
Parma it has also been estimated future yearly demand on the assumption that its 
average increase would be similar to that of total demand for mobility in the region 
Emilia-Romagna (3%), that should concentrate on public transportation. In the same 
year the Region Lombardia presented an analysis comparing demand and supply in the 
airport basin and in the Milano area that points out the need of a different articulation of 
shifts and of a limited increase in the number of licences. In the survey of Banca d’Italia 
only in one case the new licence issue has been based on a specific request of the 
operators. 
 
 
5. Situation and dynamics of the market 
 
The analytical scheme of section 2 shows that the main variables describing a taxi 
market are price (more in general the fare structure), the level and the distribution of 
effective supply in the area and in the daytime, the demand characteristics and in 
particular its relationship with the waiting time function. A second group of relevant 
variables are potential demand and unsatisfied demand (that give information on the 
height of barriers to entry), potential supply (that gives information on rents), and 
service costs. A third group includes the context variables (extension and characteristics 
of the territory and of the urbanization), the availability of strict substitutes for public 
use (km of underground) and local policies already implemented that can influence the 
efficiency of the service (length and degree of traffic restrictions in the traffic limited 
zone, reserved lanes, and so on).  
With reference to this last set of variables, the sample of the cities included in the 
survey of Banca d’Italia is quite diversified. The size of the land area of each city is 
very different even inside the same class-size of the cities. Roma is seven times wider 
than Milano; Ravenna is the second Italian city in terms of square kilometres. In some 
small cities (Bergamo, Siena, Pisa, and Pavia) the traffic limited zone is wider than in 
Firenze. Among the first 10 cities in terms of population 5 have an underground 
network (Roma, Milano, Napoli, Genova, and Torino). Among the big and middle-size 
cities in the sample, Firenze and Bologna have the wider traffic limited zone in km per 
inhabitant (10.11 and 8.43 square metres per inhabitant, respectively), followed by a 
second group (Palermo, Napoli, Verona, and Roma, with 5.66, 3.49, 3.43, and 2.44 
square metres/inhabitant).13  
In the following sections there will be presented some information on the two group 
of variables. 
 
                                                 
13
 The data quoted here are taken from Istat. 
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5.1. The number of taxi licences and NCC authorizations 
 
The results of the Banca d’Italia survey indicate that the average number of taxis per 
10,000 inhabitants is 20.8 for the big cities, 12.2 for the middle-size ones, and 3.4 for 
the small ones (Table 2). For NCC the ratio with respect to population is on average 2.3, 
with a more homogeneous distribution with respect to that of taxi. The variance is quite 
high also inside each group of cities (Figure 2). 
Table 2: Distribution of taxi and NCC supply in the main Italian cities. 
Taxi licences per 10,000 inhabitants NCC authorizations per 10,000 inhabitants Type of city 
Mean Minimun Maximum Coefficient 
of variation Mean 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Small cities   3.4 0.7 12.1 0.6 2.0 0.6 
Middle-size cities 12.2 3.9 35.1 0.8 3.9 0.6 
Big cities 20.8 4.8 37.1 0.5 2.4 0.4 
Total   5.8 0.7 37.1 1.2 2.3 0.7 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007. 
 
In general taxi availability is weakly correlated with NCC supply (the correlation 
coefficient is equal to 0.24), and there are on average 7 NCC available every 10 taxis. 
Yet the ratio between NCC and taxi tends to be inversely related with city size (from 0.2 
for big cities to 0.5 for middle-size cities to 0.8 for small ones14), and it is higher in 
tourist centres where demand fluctuates seasonally. This plausibly reflects the fact that 
in these cases it would be costlier to set up a service with specific obligations (shifts, 
and so on). 
Relating licences to resident population allows to scale the data of the different cities 
but does not give precise information on service adequacy with respect to potential 
demand. An effective regulation, that does not want to take the risk of restricting supply 
excessively, should be based on a careful examination of demand conditions and of 
service profitability in the different hours and periods. In Italy the surveys done to this 
end are very rare.  
In Roma two surveys on residents have been conducted. The first one showed an 
average unsatisfied demand (because the interviewed person could not find a vacant 
taxi) of 20%, with peaks up to 27% in December, waiting time from 4 to 24 minutes (on 
average 15 minutes for the suburbs) and a ratio of non-dispatched demand by the radio-
dispatching centres of 20-30% (Sta, 2001). The second, conducted by the Agency for 
the control and the quality of local public services of Roma (AGSPL) in 2003, found 
that: i) 18% of residents use taxis (on average one trip every two months); this means 
that more than 80% of interviewed people never or hardly ever use taxis; ii) more than 
8% does not use taxis (or does not use them more frequently) because it does not save 
enough time, more than one third because taxis are too costly, 10% and 5.4%, 
respectively (among those that use them in the area of residence or in the area of work) 
because it is difficult to find a vacant one (AGSPL, 2004b, 2004c). A survey done by 
ACI-Eurispes (2006) finds that 1.2% of interviewed people use taxis often or 
                                                 
14
 Among these cities, the 6 with a ratio NCC/taxi particularly high are: Potenza (5), Perugia, and 
Ravenna (2.2), Campobasso (1.7), Novara (1.6), Bergamo (1.4). 
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systematically and 79.2% never turns to them. A survey by Altroconsumo (2007), 
conducted in the last months of 2006, finds a particularly long waiting time at the main 
railways stations’ parkings and at the airports of Bologna, Firenze, Milano, and Roma. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of taxi and NCC supply in the main Italian cities (taxi and NCC per 10,000 
inhabitants). 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007, and Istat. 
Note: For Venezia only land licences are considered. 
 
In Table 3 we tried to supplement the simple ratio of licences to population in the 
municipality with other indicators that could proxy potential demand such as the 
number of firms, tourists, occasional or frequent visitors of the city for study or business 
purposes, the territorial extension of the territory, the presence in the surroundings of an 
airport or of trade fair facilities, the subway extension, and so on. For simplicity, we 
consider only the 11 greatest Italian cities (in terms of population).  
The table shows that often the ordering changes with the indicator considered. For 
example for Milano the index based on municipality population exceeds that of Roma 
by more than 50%, but it is very similar to the latter when the provincial population is 
considered, and reduces further if the provincial firms are taken. The relative position of 
Bologna moves down from the fifth to the tenth position if instead of population 
(provincial or of the municipality) one takes the firms number. In the case of the ratio 
licences/tourists Roma falls to the fifth place, after Milano, Torino, Napoli, and Genova. 
The capital looks relatively more deficient of taxis also if one consider as a scale 
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variable the number of airport passengers, falling at the fifth place, and Milano falling to 
the seventh one. 
Table 3: Distribution of taxi supply in the main Italian cities with respect to several reference parameters 
(indices: Roma=100). 
Munici-
pality 
Population 
resident in 
the 
municipality 
Population 
resident in 
the province 
Licences/ 
municipality 
population 
Licences/ 
population 
of the 
province 
Licences/ 
firms in the 
province 
Licences/ 
tourists’ 
arrivals 
Licences/ 
airport’s 
passengers 
Roma 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Milano 51.4 96.8 155.6 82.6 52.9 139.6 88.4 
Napoli 38.6 76.8 101.1 50.8 179.0 123.6 267.5 
Palermo 26.3 30.9 20.0 17.0 96.7 39.9 43.0 
Genova 24.3 22.1 58.8 64.7 111.0 106.0 464.6 
Torino 17.0 56.0 147.1 44.7 51.2 137.3 270.2 
Bologna 14.7 23.8 73.7 45.5 45.2 68.4 95.4 
Firenze 14.4 24.2 67.9 40.4 56.8 23.0 222.7 
Bari 12.8 39.8 19.6 6.3 17.6 37.1 45.1 
Catania 11.9 26.8 26.1 11.6 63.8 39.6 20.1 
Venezia 10.6 20.8 16.2 2.2 98.9 8.2 12.2 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007, Istat, and Assaeroporti. 
Note: Data on population resident in the municipality refer to the end of 2005, data on population resident 
in the province refer to the end of 2006. Data on firms refer to 2004 (database Asia), tourists refer to the 
province and to 2005, airports’ passengers data refer to 2006 and exclude transits. For Venezia only land 
licences are considered. 
 
In dynamic terms these data show that, while population was basically static in the 
last ten years, almost always the other indicators of potential demand had and 
expansionary trend. For example, between 1991 and 2006 passengers’ traffic at the 
airports more than doubled in Roma, almost tripled in Milano (exceeding 30 mln in both 
cases), more than tripled in Bologna. In Venezia the increase has been greater than 
300%; even higher growth rates have been registered in some minor airports, among 
which Bergamo (from almost 250,000 to more than 5.2 mln), Treviso (from more than 
84,000 to 1.3 mln), and Forlì. From 1990 to 2005 tourists’ arrivals in the respective 
provinces tripled in Milano, Venezia, and Roma (in this last city they went from 5.5 to 
17.4 mln), in Bologna they increased from a little more than 1 mln to 2.7 mln. Last, in 
2000-04 the number of visitors to Italian trade fairs increased on average by 11.5% 
(Censis, 2006).  
Against these phenomena, the adjustment in the supply of taxi and NCC has been 
fragmentary and very limited. 41.8% of the municipalities in the sample assigned the 
last licences more than 20 years ago (43.3% for NCC; Figure 3). 
For taxis 12 municipalities never had selections for the assignment of new licences or 
last selections date back to the sixties; 6 municipalities did not give any answer to this 
question. In the 5 years preceding the survey there is a resumption of taxi licences 
assignment for about one third of the municipalities. A similar trend is found for NCC, 
for which a little more than two fifth of the municipalities issued the last authorizations 
more than 20 years ago and a similar share did that in the last 5 years (no authorizations 
have been issued from 16 to 20 years ago). In the more recent years (before the Bersani 
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law) it seems that municipalities tried to increase the service mostly through new NCC 
authorizations. Yet it does not emerge a clear relationship between the recent issue of 
licences/authorizations and relative shortage (in terms of the ranking of the city by level 
of NCC authorizations previous to the new issue). Among the municipalities that issued 
them more recently, only 3 had more taxis than the average.  
 
26.9
16.4
7.5
7.5
41.8
0.0 5 .0 1 0.0 1 5.0 20 .0 2 5.0 3 0.0 35 .0 40 .0 4 5.0
L as t 5 yea rs
6 -1 0 yea rs
11 -1 5 yea rs
16 -2 0 yea rs
M ore tha n 2 0 yea rs
Taxi
 
40.3
10.4
6.0
43.3
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0
Last 5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
More than 20 years
NCC
Figure 3: Number of years since the last assignment of taxi licences and NCC authorizations (percentages 
of municipalities interviewed). 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007. 
Note: For Venezia both land and lagoon licences are considered. Data on licences issued more than 20 
year ago include no answers. 
 
The criteria chosen by municipalities to rank applicants for licences/authorizations 
assignment are of various kind. Among the preferential qualifications of applicants, 
very often the more relevant one is to have been a substitute driver for a certain amount 
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of time. In this way family members of the drivers are favoured, given that they have 
higher probability of having done this for some time. Generally in the main cities and in 
those preferred by tourists the knowledge of a foreign language is positively valued. The 
choice of other preferential qualifications goes from the educational degree (this is the 
case of Roma municipality in 2001 selection) to the registration in the unemployment or 
mobility rolls (regulation of the Reggio nell’Emilia municipality) and includes 
sometimes indicators of the dependency burden. 
After the Bersani law there have been no generalized changes in the industry. Yet the 
main cities implemented some relevant initiatives. In some of them the monitoring 
committee has been introduced. Among the most interesting innovations, in Roma there 
has been an increase in the number and in the length of shifts, in the cases where it is 
possible to use substitutes in taxi driving. As a whole these measures should have 
increased the effective service in peak times of about 2,500 taxis. The municipality has 
also assigned to Censis research institute a study on the evaluation of taxi necessity in 
town and to ATAC spa a feasibility study of a technologically advanced monitoring 
system. After the taxi drivers representatives showed their opposition to the use of any 
satellite control system, the municipality issued (free of charge) about 1,950 licences 
(until the first half of 2008) and intended to issue 250 more before June 2009. When all 
this project will be concluded, the number of licences should be higher by 30%. In 
Milan the increase in the service supply has been obtained by a reorganization of shifts, 
also with the option of drivers to hire drive substitutes. Service monitoring has been 
done through remote connections with the radio-dispatching centres. In Firenze 60 new 
licences have been issued together with 30 temporary ones (+15.2%), the shift time has 
been increased and new types of service have been introduced. In Bologna, were no new 
licences have been issued since 1983, in March 2007 there has been an agreement of the 
municipality with taxi representatives to issue (for a fee) 42 licences (+6.4%, from an 
initial proposal of about 130), part of which will be used for preferential service for 
disabled people. In June 2008 the municipality opened a competition for 41 licences, of 
which 23 for disabled preferential service (sold for € 150,000) and 18 with some 
restrictions on the service (type and area of demand, sold for € 125,000), and a rebate of 
€ 12,500 in the case of the use of a hybrid and/or electric vehicle. 90 people applied for 
the licences.15 Licences have been assigned in March 2009 (two years after the 
agreement). In Modena an agreement between taxi drivers and the municipality (April 
2008) provides for the issue of 10 licences (for a fee) and 5 temporary licences together 
with a fare increase of 8.5%. In Perugia the municipality has planned to issue 8 new 
licences (+28.6%), while in Siena it has been introduced the possibility to have more 
shifts per car by hiring driver substitutes; in the mid of 2007 a selection started for 2 taxi 
licences and 3 NCC authorizations. In Napoli the municipality carried out a survey to 
evaluate taxi availability in taxi ranks in the different times of the day. In Pisa in 2007 
12 new licences have been issued (+25%). In Palermo 80 licences were already assigned 
in 2006 (+30%), after a selection started in 2005. 
Beside the supply increase, the municipalities of Roma and Milano implemented 
some policies to improve the service, among which the creation of a single telephone 
number for calling taxis at their ranks and some measures to contrast unauthorized 
                                                 
15
 The cost of licences has been set at a level lower than the secondary market price given the constraints 
associated to these new licences. If demand is greater than supply the municipality selects applicants by 
testing them on their knowledge of the area (roads, cultural sites and so on), of a foreign language and by 
assigning some points to the school degree attained and to the status of unemployed. 
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service. In Milan the agreement of November 2006 with the operators associations also 
provides some measures to improve taxi mobility (increase of reserved lanes, 
enforcement of controls for the no parking and restricted traffic areas, activation of new 
cameras). Moreover the municipality introduced subsidies for the renewal of the car 
pool, of radio equipment, the installation of POS facilities, the use of satellite navigator 
systems, and so on (Ministero dello sviluppo economico, 2007). 
Other indicators of supply adequacy can be derived from the presence of entry queues 
and of rents arising from the possession of a licence, licence that is primarily distributed 
for free. From the first point of view, an indication can be drawn from the number of 
subjects with the minimum requisites to participate to a licence issuing session (in Italy 
the registration to the specific roll established in the provincial Chambers of commerce) 
and from number of applications to the public contests for a licence. 
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Figure 4: Ratio of taxi and NCC over the number of persons registered in the rolls of drivers for non 
scheduled transport services. 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007. 
 
The survey shows that in the main Italian cities for each licence holder there is at least 
another subject registered in the roll established in the provincial Chamber of commerce 
that could, potentially, participate to the municipal contests to allocate licences or NCC 
authorizations (Figure 4).16 
Information on the price of licences on the secondary market are scarce and sporadic. 
The only one done systematically has been carried out in Roma in 2003 by submitting a 
questionnaire to a sample of operators, and asked for information on the period 1980-
2002. The survey shows that, compared to an average investment in real estate in Roma 
municipality, from 1986 to 2002 the purchase of a taxi licence would have had a higher 
yield by about 0.5 percentage points (Visco Comandini et al., 2004). The recent value of 
licences varies, according to various sources, from € 50-60,000 in Bari to € 300,000 in 
                                                 
16
 This indicator has a limited informative capacity because it is influenced by the licences availability on 
the secondary market, by the diffusion of driver substitutes (registered in the rolls too) and by the time 
proximity of new contests (in that case normally there is an increase in registrations). This information 
has been given very partially by the municipalities interviewed: 12% of them did not give any 
information, in 3 regions the roll has not been created and in Friuli-Venezia Giulia the roll is regional 
instead of provincial. 
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Firenze; according to a survey of the municipality, in Bologna the licences value is 
around € 250,000 for taxis, and € 125,000 for the NCC.17 
The actual supply of taxis does not depend only on the number of licences, but also on 
the possibility and the actual use of the same vehicle by drivers’ substitutes, on the 
number of shifts and hour ceilings fixed by local regulation, and on the actual schedule 
of individual taxi drivers. The number of service hours guaranteed in a typical working 
day (vehicle-hour) can therefore vary considerably with respect to the number of 
licences too, according to municipal regulations. If, as in the Italian case, one licence 
corresponds to one vehicle (but it is possible in some case the use of driver’s 
substitutes), the potential maximum supply is given by having all vehicles circulating 24 
hours a day. With respect to this potential ceiling, the regulation sets compulsory and 
optional shifts, maximum working schedules for the individual taxi driver (for example 
9.2 hours in Napoli, 10 hours in Roma, 12 hours in Torino, Genova, Bologna, and 
Firenze) and limits to the possibility of using driver’s substitutes.  
It is likely that if in this type of choices operators have a wide margin of action, they 
would choose a schedule that concentrates taxi availability in the hours of higher 
demand, at the expense of non-peak hours. The Banca d’Italia survey indicates that for 
about one third of municipalities shifts are organized by the operators’ organizations 
and in a little more than 12% of the cities shifts are not regulated; in Palermo there are 
regulated shifts only for the airport service.  
Another aspect which is relevant for the actual availability of the service is the choice 
of drivers to work in the optional shifts, and the possibility for the municipality to 
monitor the actual service provision in the compulsory shifts and the compliance with 
the hours ceiling. While it is basically impossible to verify the actual work of the 
operator in the established shifts (in the absence of remote control mechanisms on the 
use of the vehicle), it is quite simple to check the extra work. The actual supply is 
therefore undetermined to a great degree, and, where they have been set, the hour 
ceilings for each shift determine the maximum actual supply. Moreover, given the 
different route profitability, there could be some cream skimming effects on some 
routes, with a territorial concentration of supply. 
The actual supply of the service depends also on the possibility, given by some 
regional regulation, to pick up the client also outside the territory of the municipality 
that issued the licence. Apart from specific exceptions when there is an airport in the 
outskirts (normally in these cases the service is regulated by agreements among the 
interested municipalities), the survey showed that this possibility is provided in 10.4% 
and 19.4% of the municipalities for taxi and NCC, respectively. 
 
5.2. Taxi fares 
 
Fares for a 5 km trip on a working day (and working time) vary from 3.7 to 15.2 euro, 
and the average is 8 euro (Table 4). These data do not take into account the time charge 
that applies when the speed is lower than a certain threshold (normally 20 km/hour), for 
example at the traffic lights or in the case of traffic jam. The results of the survey show 
a high fare variance, especially in the fixed component and in particular for middle-size 
cities. 
                                                 
17
 See Visco Comandini et al. (2004), Bergantino and Boitani (2003), Boeri (2006), Il Sole 24 Ore, July 4, 
2006.  
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Table 4: Structure of urban taxi fare in the main Italian cities by city size (€). 
Type of city Mean Minimum Maximum 
Difference 
between min. 
and max. 
Coefficient of 
variation 
FIXED COMPONENT 
Small cities 3.0 1.7 5.2 3.5 0.22 
Middle-size cities 3.7 1.8 8.7 6.9 0.57 
Big cities 2.7 2.3 3.3 0.9 0.12 
Total 3.0 1.7 8.7 7.0 0.32 
VARIABLE COMPONENT (PER KM) 
Small cities 1.0 0.1 1.6 1.5 0.28 
Middle-size cities 0.9 0.7 1.3 0.6 0.23 
Big cities 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.08 
Total 1.0 0.1 1.6 1.5 0.27 
TOTAL COST FOR 5 KM TRIP 
Small cities 8.0 3.7 11.0 7.4 0.18 
Middle-size cities 8.4 5.9 15.2 9.3 0.33 
Big cities 6.8 6.2 7.8 1.6 0.08 
Total 8.0 3.7 15.2 11.6 0.21 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007. 
(1) Data refer to the end of 2006. Weekday urban fares in business hours. 
 
Fares are lower in the big cities than elsewhere. A possible explanation of this 
difference is that it reflects the bigger market size and the presence of concentration 
poles of users, such as airports and main railway stations, that tend to reduce waiting 
time of customers and empty trips. The greater congestion of big cities also tends to 
increase the actual cost vis-à-vis the theoretical one more than in the other urban 
centres; for example, with the fare in force in Roma in 2007, a 5 minutes car stop (at the 
traffic lights or when the car slows down in the traffic jam, the time-fare applies) in a 5 
km trip increases the total cost of about one third. 
A meaningful comparison of service cost in the different cities should indeed take into 
account, together with the theoretical cost for a given trip, its significance, that is its 
closeness to the actual consumer’s expenditure. The latter depends on congestion as 
well as the number of supplements and of fares different from the basic one, that reduce 
the fare transparency and leave room for operators’ opportunistic behaviour. Among 
supplements, those that affect more the final price are the booking charges that are 
levied on customers who book taxis by telephone (included the dead-running cost) and 
the luggage charges. For example in Roma in 2007 the working day fare for a 5 km trip 
with a 5 minute time charge (for stops) and a luggage was € 8.99, more than 44% the 
basic one (€ 6.23).18 The survey of Banca d’Italia indicates an average of 4.5 
supplements in the fare book. 
In the determination of the final cost for the user it is also possible some interference 
of the taxi driver that can choose a trip longer than necessary, arriving at the place of the 
                                                 
18
 In this computation we did not consider the value of the single fare unit, but simply the hypothetical 
time and km fares. At the beginning of 2008 in Roma the supplement for the first piece of luggage has 
been eliminated (see further on). 
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call with a taximeter already very high, or considering as a luggage a bag which is 
actually smaller than the regulated limit. In the survey done by Altroconsumo (2007) 
44% of taxis arrived at the place were the booking was made more than 5 minutes 
earlier (the time charges apply) or later than agreed; in Firenze the amount indicated in 
the taximeter at destination varied from 2.74 to 9.64 euro. In 9% of the cases the initial 
charge was higher than expected19 or it has been increased by applying undue 
supplements. This type of effects could be limited by introducing receipts more detailed 
and with fiscal effect, that could increase transparency in the customer’s relationship. 
The new taxi regulation of Roma, not yet approved in April 2009, provides that taxis 
should have a device connected to the taximeter that can, on request, issue a receipt with 
the trip details (fares, trip length, supplements applied, and so on). In Bologna the 
regulation sets a ceiling on the price indicated in the taximeter at the arrival of the taxi 
at the calling place (a similar ceiling was set by the new regulation of Roma). Another 
instrument to increase transparency and reduce the opportunistic behaviour of drivers is 
the introduction of flat rates. In 20.9% of municipalities there are flat rates, generally for 
the airport (for example in Roma and Milano); in Torino it has been introduced a flat 
rate inside the traffic-limited zone, in Napoli flat rates for several routes have been 
introduced. 
The use of a two-part tariff is generalized for taxis, with higher fares both for the 
fixed and for the variable part in days and times of soft demand. In the smaller cities 
group it is higher both the average fixed part than the fare per km. The economic theory 
suggests the use of a two-part tariff (as an alternative to average cost pricing) for 
regulated natural monopolies, so as to allow the firm to recover high fixed costs. A part 
from the level of fixed costs another motivation for using a two part tariff for taxis is 
given by the presence of an opportunity cost for trips, because when the driver takes on 
a customer she gives up the chance of finding a more profitable one (by increasing 
search and waiting time costs). In this sense the adoption of a fare with a fixed part 
should provide incentives to avoid an opportunistic behaviour (both unlawfully or 
simply by operating only in areas where longer trips are requested, such as airports). 
Moreover the different level of the two fare components could reflect the aim to 
guarantee a similar average income to the operators in cities with different 
length/average distances. For the first 8 Italian cities there are no significant differences 
in the contribution of the two tariff components to the total cost (Figure 5). 
On the whole, there is no evidence of a relationship between taxi supply and fare level 
(Figure 6). In more than 50% of the sample fare changes have been done at intervals at 
most of three years. This share includes mostly the cities of Centre and North of Italy, 
while in the South and in Islands fare adjustments tend to be done at larger time 
intervals. Fare adjustments are never decided on the basis of demand indicators 
(analysis of elasticity, of demand intensity in “soft” hours, and so on), but simply tend 
to follow closely the change of the Istat index of consumer prices; in some cases the 
specific input costs are also considered (car insurance, fuel cost, and so on). 
Data on local cost differentials are not available. Some methodological indications 
can be drawn, with some caution, by a study by the Irish Commission for taxi regulation 
(2005), that for Ireland does not find significant territorial differences, except for fuel 
and insurance costs. Average employee labour incomes show instead some variance 
                                                 
19
 This may happen, for example, if the driver inserts in the taximeter the night or Sunday starting fare, 
which is higher, when another fare applies. 
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around the national mean, that comes down considerably when considering industries 
separately. 
For Italy, the ACI indicator of operating cost/km gives some aggregated information. 
For a diesel car20 cost per km vary between 0,30 and 0,29 euro respectively for an 
annual run of 50,000 and 60,000 km. Fuel weighs 32.7% upon total variable costs and 
maintenance has a weight only marginally lower. 
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Figure 5: Contribution of the fixed component and of the distance charge to the total taxi cost for a urban 
journey length of 5 km in the main Italian cities (percentages). 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007. 
Note: Data refer to the end of 2006. Weekday urban fares in business hours. 
 
Among fixed costs, which represent between 23.2% and 20.1% of total costs, car 
CDW insurance is the most significant one (58.7%). Another factor that influences the 
cost function is the use, established by the national regulation (with some specific 
exceptions introduced by the Bersani law), of the taxi in only one shift, that hampers the 
distribution of fixed costs on a higher number of km. Radio-dispatching services21 are 
estimated to cost about 170 euro per month by Asso Taxi (and normally they are 
compensated both by a specific fixed component of the fare and by the fact that taxi 
drivers set the taximeter on at the moment of the customer’s call and until they reach 
their client22). There are also additional costs (with respect to the ACI indicator) of 
CDW insurance premium, due to the higher frequency of accidents of taxis. According 
to ANIA data, in 2005 this frequency was on average 21.98% against 7.17% for the 
other cars23. Service costs are also influenced by a partial refund of oil excises. Last, the 
                                                 
20
 Data refer to a car with a power of 1,500-2,000 and to March 2007.  
21
 According to the sector tax benchmarking study, the share of taxi drivers with a radio-dispatching 
service is about 32% in the low population density areas and about 90% and 78% respectively in the 
medium/high and high population density areas.  
22
 Moreover almost all radio-taxi firms are cooperatives whose members are the same taxi drivers that 
make use of the radio-taxi services and that participate to the radio-taxi company profits.  
23
 Data are very variable across cities and oscillate (for taxis) from 5% in Ferrara to 61% in Caserta. For 
the big cities the taxi frequency of accidents varies from 20% to 25%. 
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taxi driver remuneration could be assumed to be about 50% of total costs. Therefore, the 
total cost/km could be around 0.6 euro. 
The choice of the fare level (and in parallel of the licences number) by the regulator 
should take into account, beside cost components, also the level of the rents that a given 
regulation generates on the market. An indicator of these rents is given by the fact that, 
despite the fact that licences have been until now assigned free of charge (with the only 
important exception of Bologna), they have been sold at quite high prices on the 
secondary market (see § 5.1).  
 
3.0
5.0
7.0
9.0
11.0
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
b ig  c ities
m idd le-s ize  c ities
sm all c ities
M ilano
R eggio  C alabria
G enova
N apoli
R om a
B ologna
S iracusa
V icenza
T rev iso Ba ri
C atan ia
T orino
F irenze
T rieste
S iena
T ern i
P otenza N ovara
B rind is i Lecce
Aosta V erona
       P adova
P isa
Brescia
B olzano
C aglia ri
P a lerm o
La S pezia
T axi per 10 ,000 inhab itants
Co
st
 
fo
r 
5 
km
 
tri
p 
 
 Venezia
T arantoFoggia
 
Figure 6: Number of taxi per 10,000 inhabitants and average cost for a urban trip of 5 km in the main 
Italian cities by city size. 
Source: survey of Banca d’Italia on the supply and price of taxi service, 2007. 
Note: Data refer to the end of 2006. Weekday urban fares in business hours. Data for the laguna of 
Venezia are not included. 
 
The verification of the real returns of taxi drivers, that could be a relevant variable for 
the regulator, is difficult because taxi drivers are exempted from the release of a fiscal 
receipt. According to the data of Agenzia delle entrate, the average income declared by 
a taxi driver was 11,482 euro in 2004 (against 20,345 euro for a metalworker) and 
13,800 in 2005. In Bologna the average income declared by the category in 2005 was 
6,184 euro. These data seem to contrast with the high licences value on the secondary 
market. Moreover, the controls by the revenue authorities show a percentage of tax 
evaders in the sector of about 70%, having declared an average number of km lower of 
about 37% and a fuel cost lower of about 22% than the real one. Fiscal inspections have 
also found tax evasions in the licences sales that would amount, between 2000 and 
2003, to 19.6 mln of euro in Lombardia and 18.8 mln in Lazio.24 
An interesting aspect of the phase of bargaining with the municipalities following the 
introduction of the Bersani law is that in most cases taxi drivers asked for a fare increase 
as a counterpart to accept new licences. In Firenze fares have increased by more than 
20% (26% and 20.8% for the fixed component and the distance charge, respectively), in 
Roma at the beginning of 2008 the fare increased by 18% (with a supplement of 2 euro 
                                                 
24
 See La Repubblica, November 30, 2007, p. 3. 
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for departures from the Termini railway station and the suppression of the supplement 
for the first piece of luggage), in Milano in July 2007 there has been an increase of the 
distance charge of 12.6%, while the initial fixed charge has not been changed. Annual 
fare changes have been scheduled but subject to service quality evaluations. In Bologna 
in 2008 the fare increase has been about 8%; there is a discount of 3 euro ( for a limited 
amount of trips per year) to women travelling alone between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.. 
The coupling of licences increase and fare increase reflects several motivations 
(Aquilina, 2008). For the municipalities, it is a compromise to reduce the operators’ 
resistance to the increase in the number of licences. For taxi drivers, instead, the 
rationality of this request depends on the elasticities of demand with respect to waiting 
time and price, as can be derived from the model presented in § 2. From (7), if |ω|<1 an 
increase in n, all other things being equal, determines a reduction in unit revenues (per 
operator). In this case taxi drivers could ask to the regulator a fare increase in order to 
try in this way to get returns back at least at the level prevailing before the increase in n. 
From (8) this happens if |η|≤1 (i.e. if demand is not very elastic with respect to price). In 
line with theoretical results, the municipality of Roma decided that fares have to be 
considered as “maximum fares” instead of fixed levels. This greater flexibility seems to 
be barely used by operators (AGSPL, 2007). 
 
 
6. Some final remarks 
 
In taxi and NCC markets demand depends not only on price but also on the quality of 
service. This last variable is related to general urban traffic and mobility policies and on 
waiting time. In a market where price and supply are fixed by a regulator, demand will 
adjust through changes in waiting time. This creates the possibility of multiple 
equilibria since demand depends on supply size through its dependence on waiting time. 
The regulator has a very difficult task, having to define a price and a supply level that at 
the same time are suitable to demand characteristics (and influence it through waiting 
time) and ensure an “acceptable” income to the operators in the market. This requires a 
continuous acquisition of information on demand and supply conditions, that was 
lacking in the Italian system. 
Indeed the Italian regulation seems to derive more from some forms of capture of the 
regulator than from the presence of market failures. In local consulting bodies there is 
an over-representation of operators with respect to customers, with a frequent fare 
revision and a time-invariant supply, despite the fact that several demand indicators 
showed a growing dynamics. The large differences in supply, fares level and structure, 
and other operating rules across cities are difficult to explain on the basis of market 
conditions. The use of instruments of market knowledge by the regulator has been rare 
and sporadic, and service quality, also in terms of waiting time, has been deteriorating 
over time. The prohibition of creating “taxi companies” with multiple licences has no 
economic justification. 
Instead of introducing a real deregulation, the Bersani law increased the number of 
options available to municipalities to increase supply, introducing also instruments of 
partial compensation of incumbents. The legislator’s approach seems to have 
acknowledged the difficulties to implement more radical reforms in a single step, given 
the operators’ bargaining power, especially in the big cities. The supply increase 
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implemented in some big cities has been obtained in exchange for fare increases that 
may have somehow discouraged the additional demand deriving from the reduction in 
waiting time. 
The options chosen by municipalities among the ones available, the operators’ 
reactions and the effect on local regulations and markets suggest some lines for 
intervention that, even in a non-liberalized market, may increase efficiency in the Italian 
market as well in other countries with highly regulated taxi and NCC services.  
First, it seems appropriate the introduction of a “higher level” of regulation in the 
industry. The municipal regulator hardly ever used its main advantage, the possibility of 
knowing closely the market, while it has often been captured by local operators (this 
risk being its main disadvantage). The introduction at the national level of some norms 
that make compulsory the use of specific indicators of supply shortage and of need of 
fare adjustment and the opening of the market to companies that could own more than 
one licence could help to improve the situation. 
A second action regards the integrated government of mobility at the local level, with 
the use of instruments such as the increase of reserved lanes for public transport and of 
limited traffic zones, road pricing, integrated transport fare systems, introduction of 
parking fees, and so on. The improvement of these context factors could increase 
significantly service efficiency and average speed and reduce waiting time.  
A third useful instrument could be the introduction of additional mechanisms to 
increase service transparency with respect both to customers and to the regulator. 
Among the possible measures there are a drastic reduction of supplements and the 
delivery to the customer of a detailed receipt (with fiscal effect too).  
Last, the regulator could also evaluate the use of compensation schemes (additional to 
the one already set by the Bersani law) for the annulment of licences value on the 
secondary market, that could be used as an instrument to overcome the opposition of 
incumbents to further supply increases.  
The Italian experience shows that regulation itself can create rents that reinforce the 
influence of incumbents on regulators. The resulting market setting may solve, at least 
in part, some of the market failures, but at a very high cost in terms of consumers’ 
welfare and total welfare and makes it very difficult to introduce significant changes.  
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